



Armenia Struggles To Break Out of Russia's Orbit

by Matthew Stein

KEY TAKEAWAYS

- Armenia believes that Russia and the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) have failed to fulfill their obligations to Armenia during clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan since the end of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020.
- Armenia's decision to leave the CSTO in 2024, limit security cooperation with Russia, and increase security cooperation with Western partners in the past couple of years point to an Armenian pivot away from Russia.
- While Western partners could be eager to capitalize on Armenia's pivot away from Russia, an examination of Armenia-Russia bilateral security cooperation and Armenia-Russia economic ties will explain just how difficult it will be for Armenia to disentangle itself from Russia, despite its strong desire to do so.

In February 2024, the government of Armenia announced it was suspending its participation in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a political-military organization established in 2002 by Russia, Armenia, and several former Soviet Republics to deal with security challenges in the Eurasia region. Shortly after the announcement, Armenian officials sent a notification to the Russian government requesting Russian border guards withdraw from their post at the Zvartnots International

Airport, outside Armenia's capital Yerevan, and stating Armenian border guards would take over duties there. Since then, Armenian officials have also announced they will purchase fewer Russian weapons and equipment. Armenia's steps to disengage from Russia and the CSTO are significant, as Russia has been Armenia's most important security cooperation partner since it became independent after the fall of the Soviet Union. Armenia's relations with both Russia and the CSTO were already strained in the years prior

Author

Matthew Stein is a contractor at the Foreign Military Studies Office, focusing on Eurasian security issues. He holds a master's degree in Russian and Eurasian studies from the University of Kansas, and held a National Security Education Program (NSEP) Boren Fellowship in Kazakhstan (2008-09). He has published articles in *Military Review*, *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, and *Small Wars Journal*.

to its disengagement from both, but Russia and the CSTO's responses to clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan in recent years only exacerbated tensions. The Armenian government believed Russia and the CSTO failed to fulfill their obligations to Armenia by failing to intervene against Azerbaijan during the clashes. As a result, Armenia has slowly been turning away from Russia and more actively engaging with western security cooperation partners, including the United States and France. While Armenia is distancing itself from the CSTO and Russia, an examination of Armenia's military and economic ties with Russia show there is only so fast and so far Armenia can pull away from its more powerful neighbor.

The First Nagorno-Karabakh War and Armenia's Relations in the Caucasus Region

Russia has been Armenia's most important security cooperation partner since it became independent following the collapse of the Soviet Union.¹ Even prior to independence, Armenia relied on support from Russia during the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, which took place between Azerbaijan and ethnic Armenians in the region, backed by the government of Armenia, 1988-1994. Armenians and Azerbaijanis had fought over Nagorno-Karabakh prior to the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, with both sides claiming historical ties to the region dating back centuries, as both ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijanis lived there. The currently recognized region of Nagorno-Karabakh lies within the internationally recognized borders of Azerbaijan.²



The Nagorno-Karabakh region lies within the internationally recognized territory of Azerbaijan

Figure 1: The South Caucasus and the Nagorno-Karabakh Region.³

When the First Nagorno-Karabakh War ended with a ceasefire agreement in 1994, the majority of ethnic Azerbaijanis who had been living in Nagorno-Karabakh fled to other parts of Azerbaijan, while the ethnic Armenians who remained in Nagorno-Karabakh created a de facto independent state within Azerbaijan. This self-proclaimed “Republic of Artsakh” became the main point of contention between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia provided support to both Armenia and Azerbaijan during the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, as a way to maintain influence in the region amid its own geopolitical issues during the collapse of the Soviet Union.⁴

In turn, Armenia provided military and financial assistance for the “Republic of Artsakh” until its dissolution in September 2023. The government of Armenia denied deploying any of its armed forces in Nagorno-Karabakh after the end of the war in 1994. Instead, the Armenian government claimed ethnic Armenian volunteers were protecting the de facto independent state, though there was evidence that Armenian armed forces units and equipment were deployed in the region.⁵ From Azerbaijan’s perspective, the Armenian armed forces and Armenian-backed militias occupied a portion of its sovereign territory.



Map of the self-proclaimed “Republic of Artsakh” from 1994-2023. The green striped territory represented the breakaway region’s territory from 1994-2020, while the yellow territory represented its territory from 2020 until its dissolution in 2023. The red line along the region’s northern and eastern boundary represented the line of contact from 1994-2020.⁶

Figure 2: Territorial Changes in Nagorno-Karabakh 1994-2023.

The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh has continued to constitute Armenia's primary security threat since the end of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. Numerous clashes have occurred between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces along the line of contact—the unofficial border between the de facto independent state and Azerbaijan—since the 1994 ceasefire took effect. The clashes have ranged from exchanges of small arms fire to artillery strikes, though the majority of these clashes have ended quickly, without further escalation. A notable exception was a large-scale clash which took place in April 2016 and resulted in Azerbaijan taking control of a small amount of territory along the line of contact.⁷ Armenia and Azerbaijan carried out peace negotiations in the years following the 1994 ceasefire, but made no significant progress, and Azerbaijan has repeatedly stated in the years since the ceasefire that it could take military action to regain its territorial integrity by seizing Nagorno-Karabakh back from ethnic Armenians. These statements took place as Azerbaijan carried out military reforms and built up its armed forces.⁸ Outside of the war over Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia and Azerbaijan have been at odds over other sections of their border, located north of Nagorno-Karabakh, yet to be officially agreed upon. The two countries engaged in significant fighting along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border north of Nagorno-Karabakh for several days in July 2020. The fighting did not result in any territorial changes, but demonstrated how contentious the border has been and how it stands as another issue between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

While Armenia has partnered closely with Russia since the end of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, Azerbaijan has had a strong partnership with Armenia's western neighbor Turkey. Azerbaijan and Turkey share significant historical, linguistic, and cultural ties, with Turkey becoming the first country to recognize Azerbaijan's independence in 1991. The two signed a military cooperation

agreement in 1992, adding subsequent and more intensive military cooperation agreements in the years since.⁹ These agreements played an important role in developing Azerbaijan's armed forces, the results of which were on display during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020.¹⁰

Armenia and Turkey have had hostile relations for a number of years and have yet to establish diplomatic ties. Their hostility stems from the status of Armenians in the latter years of the Ottoman Empire and the massacre and deportations of ethnic Armenians from eastern Turkey that took place from 1915-1917.¹¹ Since then, Armenia has advocated to have these events internationally recognized as a genocide, while the government of Turkey officially denies a genocide took place.¹² The governments of Armenia and Turkey have attempted to repair relations in recent years, but negotiations have not produced any notable results and the two countries have yet to formally establish diplomatic ties.¹³ For Armenia, the threat of conflict with Turkey is not as high as that of one with Azerbaijan, but Turkey has regularly carried out joint military exercises with Azerbaijan near Armenian territory as part of ongoing Turkish-Azerbaijani military cooperation.¹⁴ Historically, Russia has been a security guarantor for Armenia against the threat of conflict with Turkey, including by establishing the Russian 102nd Military Base in Gyumri, Armenia and posting Russian border guards along the Turkish-Armenian border. Armenia and Turkey have had a closed border since Armenia became independent. Meanwhile, Armenia has good relations with its other neighbor-states, Georgia and Iran. Armenia and Georgia signed a strategic partnership agreement in January 2024, while Armenia and Iran have maintained small, but growing economic ties.¹⁵ Neither Georgia nor Iran constitute major security issues for Armenia, compared to Azerbaijan and Turkey.

The Ties That Bind – Armenia-Russia Security and Economic Cooperation

As Armenia faced potential kinetic conflict with Azerbaijan and dealt with concerns about Turkey over the years, Russia has been Armenia's most important security partner on a bilateral and multilateral basis. Armenia and Russia signed several comprehensive bilateral military cooperation agreements, the most important of which is for the Russian 102nd Military to be based in Gyumri, an agreement that remains in effect until 2044. There are an estimated 3,000 Russian soldiers deployed there, making it one of the largest foreign deployments of Russian forces worldwide.¹⁶ According to additional bilateral agreements, an estimated 4,500 Russian border guards serve along Armenia's border with Turkey and Iran.¹⁷ Armenia and Russia also signed a bilateral joint air defense agreement in 2001 and a military-technical cooperation agreement in 2013.¹⁸ Each of these agreements have facilitated close cooperation between Armenia and Russia over the years.

In 2016, Armenia and Russia established the United Group of Forces agreement, which is made up of designated operational units from Russia's 102nd Military Base and an Armenian Army Group. As part of the agreement, these units would jointly deploy under a Russian command in response to an attack on Armenia.¹⁹ In addition, Armenia's armed forces largely uses Russian weapon systems and equipment, which Armenia inherited from the Soviet Union or acquired from Russia in the years since independence.²⁰ Russia's significance as Armenia's close partner was evident in 2016, when Armenia became the first foreign government to acquire the Russian Iskander short-range ballistic missile system.²¹

Outside of bilateral agreements with Russia, Armenia has been a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the CSTO, both

of which are Russian-led organizations involved in military and security affairs in former Soviet states. Armenia has been actively engaged with the CIS and the CSTO since their founding. The CIS has served as a successor organization to the Soviet Union since its inception in 1991, facilitating cooperation between member states after they declared independence. The CIS is made up of Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. While the General Secretary of the CIS has often been from Russia, allowing Russia to maintain influence with member states for its own purposes, CIS member states have used the organization as a mechanism to cooperate on a range of political, economic, and security issues related to their transition and development from Soviet Republics to independent states. Member states have worked out some of these issues through the military and security councils the CIS maintains, though a number of issues between member states remain.²² Neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan have looked to the CIS to resolve their conflict. CIS councils continue to meet regularly to facilitate multilateral cooperation between member states; however, the organization has rarely taken an active role in resolving regional security issues, such as providing a mechanism to deploy forces or carry out operations.²³ Instead, the CSTO has picked up part of this role as it grew out of the framework of the CIS into a separate organization.²⁴

The CSTO is comprised of Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and helps resolve military and security issues in member states. The Secretary General of the CSTO has often been from Russia and the organization holds annual summits to coordinate on issues. Member states have periodically reached agreements during annual summits that provide financial or military support for fellow members. Membership in the CSTO allows for the purchase of weapons and equipment from the Russian defense industry at




Figure 3: Membership in the CIS, CSTO, and the Eurasian Economic Union

Diagram of overlapping membership in the CIS, CSTO, and Eurasian Economic Union. Armenia has yet to officially leave the CSTO as of December 2024. Note: Moldova suspended its membership in the CIS following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 but has yet to officially leave the organization.²⁶

the same prices set for the Russian armed forces, instead of having to pay higher costs like other foreign buyers of Russian weapon systems.²⁵

Whereas the CIS focuses on having a forum for defense-related cooperation between members, among other cooperation, the CSTO has taken a more active role by establishing the Collective Operational Reaction Force to create a joint operational force available to respond to regional threats. CSTO member states can provide input on what constitutes a substantive threat to the body, but these often coincide with or are superseded by purely Russian security interests. The CSTO's Collective Operational Reaction Force is made up of operational units designated by members states to be available to deploy under a nominally CSTO, ostensibly Russian, command. Each member state contributes a battalion with the intent of averting or responding to aggression from an external state or terrorist group. Armenia designated a battalion from its army for the collective operational force, while Russia provides the largest contribution with units from its 98th Guards Airborne Division and the 31st Guards Air

Assault Brigade. Additionally, Russia provides fixed-wing and rotary attack and transport aircraft that have been posted at the Kant Airbase outside Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan on a permanent basis, specifically for the Collective Operational Reaction Force.²⁷ The units of Collective Operational Reaction Force have conducted a number of joint military exercises, and Armenian and Russian forces have participated alongside each other as well as with the other member states.²⁸

The CSTO's Collective Operational Reaction Force has deployed once in the history of its existence, when it responded to a request from the President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev for peacekeepers in the wake of civil unrest in the city of Almaty, Kazakhstan in January 2022.²⁹ The CSTO deployment to Almaty consisted of designated units from member states, including a company from Armenia, under Russian command.³⁰ The peacekeepers provided security for various infrastructure around Almaty, while internal Kazakh security forces carried out operations to restore order.³¹ The deployment ended after a few weeks and the CSTO units returned to their

home bases.³² This deployment to Kazakhstan displayed a notable change of tack, as the CSTO leadership, specifically Russian leaders, had previously rejected a request from Armenia to intervene, following clashes on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border in May 2021.³³

In addition to Armenia and Russia's bilateral and multilateral security cooperation, Armenia's economic ties to Russia also affect its ability to disengage from Russia. Armenia and Russia have had strong economic ties since Armenia became independent, with 40 percent of Armenia's exports going to Russia in 2022, up from an average of 20 percent for the several years prior.³⁴ Russia also supplies a significant share of Armenia's natural gas and food products, and Armenia relies on Rosatom, the Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation, to maintain its Metsamor nuclear power plant, which produces an estimated 30 percent of Armenia's domestic electrical consumption.³⁵ Furthermore, Russia's national railroad company controls Armenia's railroad and an Armenian-born Russian national is the majority owner in Armenia's power grid.³⁶ As noted earlier, Armenia has developed economic ties with other international partners, such as Georgia and Iran, but Armenia's closed border with Turkey has prevented stronger economic ties with Europe. And no other partner matches Russia's depth of economic involvement in Armenia.

Armenia is also a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), an organization founded in 2015 by Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. The EEU exists as a common market for member states, but also enables Russia to exercise economic influence over the other members. Direct trade between member states may occur, but the organization is largely set up to facilitate trade bilaterally between Russia and the other member states. In Armenia's case, this includes lower prices or removing tariffs on

energy imports from Russia. The EEU provides Armenia a benefit for discounted energy in this regard, but also allows Russia to exert economic influence if it decides to raise prices or revoke the tariff relief.³⁷

The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and the Beginning of Armenia's Disengagement

Despite multiple avenues of cooperation between Armenia and Russia—militarily, economically, and in international organizations—Armenia has been moving away from Russia since the end of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. Armenia's biggest grievance against Russia and the reason for its current disengagement is its belief that Russia and the CSTO failed to adequately respond to the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020 and to the clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the years since. While the First Nagorno-Karabakh War resulted in a de facto independent state within Azerbaijan, the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War reduced the size of the breakaway region by half. The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War began on 27 September 2020 when Azerbaijani forces carried out rocket and artillery strikes against Stepanakert, the capital of the breakaway region, and at Armenian forces in the north and south of Nagorno-Karabakh along the line of contact. Fighting continued over several weeks as Azerbaijani forces punched through the line of contact and captured territory across southern Nagorno-Karabakh. On 9 November 2020, the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan announced a ceasefire as brokered by Russia, which took effect on the 10th.³⁸

According to Russia and the CSTO, they did not intervene on behalf of Armenia because Nagorno-Karabakh is situated within Azerbaijan's internationally recognized borders. During the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Armenian soldiers were attacked not in Armenia, but in Nagorno-Karabakh. Nothing within Armenia's

agreements with Russia or the CSTO allowed for either to intervene because nobody attacked Armenian territory directly. The November 2020 ceasefire agreement, however, did include deploying a Russian peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh consisting of 2,000 soldiers. The Russian peacekeeping force established a dozen observation posts along the line of contact and a post in the Lachin corridor, the main roadway connecting Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia.³⁹ The Russian peacekeepers were tasked with enforcing the terms of the ceasefire between ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijani forces along the line of contact, carrying out patrols, providing escorts for civilians through the Lachin Corridor, and allowing Azerbaijan's armed forces to move freely around the country's newly acquired districts.⁴⁰

Armenia took issue with other terms of the ceasefire agreement, specifically those that allowed Azerbaijan to retain control of territory in Nagorno-Karabakh gained during the war, and take over additional districts in the west and east of Nagorno-Karabakh, thus reducing ethnic Armenian control of the region by more than half.⁴¹

Armenian officials also faced several weeks of protests from their own population for agreeing to the ceasefire and losing control over half of Nagorno-Karabakh.⁴² Despite Armenia's belief that Russia did not provide adequate support, the Russian-brokered ceasefire and the Russian peacekeeping mission likely stopped Azerbaijan from completely taking over Nagorno-Karabakh at the time.

The Russian peacekeepers dealt with a number of ceasefire violations and clashes between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces in Nagorno-Karabakh in the months and years following the ceasefire agreement.⁴³ These ranged from exchanges of small arms or artillery fire along the line of contact to Azerbaijan's blockade of the Lachin Corridor, which began in December 2022 and lasted until September 2023.⁴⁴ Regardless of which side violated the terms of the ceasefire during any given incident, Armenia believed Russian peacekeepers repeatedly failed to enforce the ceasefire.⁴⁵ Azerbaijan voiced similar arguments against the Russian peacekeeping mission following ceasefire violations.⁴⁶



Figure 4: The Lachin Corridor

The Lachin Corridor (in red and white stripes) served as the only connection Armenia had with the “Republic of Artsakh” from the end of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh on 10 November 2020 until Azerbaijan took full control of Nagorno-Karabakh in September 2023.⁴⁷

In addition to ceasefire violations in Nagorno-Karabakh, a series of clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan took place along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border in 2021 and 2022.⁴⁸ This time Armenia was involved in a conflict over its own territory, not over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, yet Russia still refused to intervene. Armenia requested the CSTO invoke Article 4 of the organization's treaty following the clashes. The CSTO article stipulates that an attack on a member state is an attack on all members, similar to NATO's Article 5.⁴⁹ The CSTO declined to intervene on behalf of Armenia in response to the clashes because the organization claimed the clashes were a border incident and the organization's Article 4 did not allow for a response since the Armenia-Azerbaijan border had yet to be officially demarcated.⁵⁰ At the same time, there were no official reports of Armenia invoking the terms of the United Group of Forces agreement it had with Russia.

Armenia began to disengage from the CSTO shortly after the latter's decision not to intervene in the 2021 and 2022 border clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Armenia declined to participate in a CSTO exercise in September 2022 and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan refused to sign and endorse the CSTO's official response to Armenia's border clashes at the organization's November 2022 summit.⁵¹ The CSTO's official response did not include the military intervention Armenia believed it should.⁵²

In addition to Armenia questioning the CSTO's response, Armenia questioned the function of the Russian peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh following Azerbaijan's blockade of the Lachin Corridor beginning in December 2022. Azerbaijan's blockade began when a group of Azerbaijani citizens blocked the road under the pretense they were concerned about the environmental impact of mining by ethnic

Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. The blockade, which reportedly included security forces from Azerbaijan in civilian clothes, cut off Nagorno-Karabakh from shipments of food and medicine as the Lachin Corridor served as the only connection between Armenia and ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, yet the Russian peacekeepers did not intervene.⁵³

On 19 September 2023, Azerbaijan carried out what it called a counterterrorism operation and took over what remained of the breakaway republic within a day, ending ethnic Armenians' control of the Nagorno-Karabakh region. The vast majority of ethnic Armenians who had been living in Nagorno-Karabakh then fled to Armenia.⁵⁴ On 5 October 2023, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan signed a declaration recognizing the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and ending Armenia's support for the breakaway republic, thus closing a chapter of Armenia's conflict with Azerbaijan.⁵⁵ Even though Azerbaijan's operation appears to have violated the terms of the 2020 ceasefire, Russia did not prevent it from taking place or take any subsequent action to mediate.⁵⁶ Pashinyan did not publicly blame Russia or Russian peacekeepers for allowing Azerbaijan to carry out its September 2023 operation, but Russia's inaction likely contributed to an overall belief that Russia failed to support Armenia. In the spring of 2024, Russian peacekeepers withdrew from Nagorno-Karabakh, now completely under Azerbaijan's control, at the behest of the Azerbaijan government.⁵⁷

Armenia Disengages From the CSTO and Takes a Step Back From Russia

Even before Armenia took steps to disengage from the CSTO and Russia, Pashinyan expressed frustration over reported delays in weapons deliveries Armenia had purchased from Russia.⁵⁸ The delays could be attributed to the Russian defense industry prioritizing fulfilling orders to

the Russian armed forces over Armenia following Russia's invasion of Ukraine and subsequent Russian losses of weapons and equipment. Nevertheless, the delays prompted Armenia to look for additional partners and sources of weapons and began disengaging from Russia and the CSTO. Armenia officially broke from the CSTO in February 2024 when it announced it had suspended its participation in the organization.⁵⁹ Armenia did not attend the CSTO's Military Committee meeting in April 2024 or the Defense Ministers Council in May.⁶⁰ Armenia stopped contributing financially to the CSTO in May as well.⁶¹ On 12 June 2024, Prime Minister Pashinyan announced Armenia would leave the CTSO, but did not provide a timeline as to when it would officially take place.⁶² As of December 2024, Armenia has yet to officially leave the CSTO.⁶³

Although Armenia remains an active member of the CIS and has not cut off bilateral security cooperation ties with Russia, according to officials in the Russian Ministry of Defense, their Armenian counterparts have shown less interest in cooperation since November 2023.⁶⁴ In addition, in March 2024, Armenia notified Russia it needed to remove its border guards from Zvartnots International Airport.⁶⁵ Furthermore, Russian and Armenian officials have clarified that Russian border guards will remain at their posts along the Armenian-Turkish border per the existing agreement, while Armenians will take over from Russian border guards at the Armenian-Iranian border by as early as January 2025.⁶⁶

Since 2022, Armenia has been increasingly engaged in establishing security cooperation partnerships and procuring weapons and equipment from partners other than Russia due to Russia delaying weapons deliveries to Armenia that year. Armenia's most significant recent security cooperation partners include India, the United States, and France. Armenia's security cooperation with India

in the past couple of years has stood out thanks to Armenia acquiring India's Swathi radar systems, Pinaka multiple rocket launchers, anti-tank rockets, and Bharat 155mm artillery systems.⁶⁷ These marked the most significant acquisitions of non-Russian weapon systems since Armenia became independent.

Armenia's security cooperation with the United States increased beginning in 2023, with joint military exercises taking place in September 2023 and July 2024.⁶⁸ The exercises, called Eagle Partner, are part of recent bilateral security cooperation that also includes the United States establishing a resident advisor within Armenia's Ministry of Defense.⁶⁹ These steps are all part of Armenia's intention to form a long-term strategic partnership with the United States.⁷⁰

Armenia has also been working more closely with European governments since 2023. Armenia signed military cooperation agreements with Greece and Cyprus in 2023 in a move that looks to partner with Turkey's adversaries, though this appears to be cursory for the time being.⁷¹ More significantly, in early 2023, Armenia signed an agreement with the European Union (EU) for a monitoring mission on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border. The mission involves over 150 civilian observers from EU member states to observe and report on the situation on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, and support confidence building measures between Armenia and Azerbaijan, where possible. The mission has a two-year mandate and while it informs Azerbaijani authorities of its activities, it works exclusively in Armenian territory.⁷² While the mission is not working to resolve or demarcate the border for Armenia, it marks another instance of Armenia looking to countries other than Russia to resolve an immediate and ongoing security issue.

Armenia has also signed agreements to acquire radar, air defense systems, and armored vehicles from France.⁷³ These acquisitions come alongside

reports that Armenia is looking to develop its air defense system according to the NATO standard.⁷⁴ Armenia began analyzing what went wrong with its air defense systems immediately following the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. Some Armenian officials blamed the Russian-supplied air defense systems for failing against Azerbaijan's Israeli-supplied loitering munitions and Turkish-supplied unmanned aerial systems. One study places the blame not on the Russian systems, but the Armenian armed forces, who should have built a more effective, multi-component, and layered air defense system, and it appears Armenia is looking to Western partners to solve this problem.⁷⁵ Armenia also purchased French CAESAR self-propelled howitzers and signed a military-technical cooperation agreement with France in June 2024 that could pave the way for deeper cooperation in the next few years.⁷⁶

Armenia's acquisitions of weapon systems from India and France provide it non-Russian replacements for certain systems, but a large part of the Armenian armed forces' inventory remains Russian. Armenia will likely continue to acquire more western weapon systems, particularly as it revamps its air defense based on the NATO model, but it remains to be seen how far military-technical cooperation with France will develop. Likewise, establishing a U.S. resident advisor in Armenia's Ministry of Defense can provide support to Armenia as the latter continues to move in a different strategic direction, but neither the advisor nor new weapon systems replace existing bilateral military cooperation agreements with Russia.

Armenia has also been looking to take economic steps away from Russia. The EU agreed to provide financial assistance to Armenia in early 2024 to facilitate further economic integration with Europe. Armenia has looked at Europe as one of its best alternatives to move away from Russia economically.⁷⁷ This is taking place alongside

Armenia's engagement with the EU via the border monitoring mission, but some in Armenia have noted that diversification efforts away from Russia will take considerable time, with the EU comprising only 12 percent of Armenian trade, compared to Russia's nearly 40 percent.⁷⁸ Armenia's economic ties with Europe will depend on whether or not Armenia can find trade routes to Europe that can circumvent Russian control. Armenia's potential deeper economic ties with Europe are also limited by the fact that Armenia's border with Turkey remains closed, which would otherwise provide a more direct trade route between Armenia and Europe. It remains to be seen if Armenia can improve relations with Turkey and open the border to facilitate any economic initiatives with Europe.



Figure 5: Armenia and Europe

Trade routes from Europe to Armenia pass through either Russia or Turkey, and with the Armenia-Turkey border remaining closed, Armenia-Europe trade remains dependent on Russia.⁷⁹

Outlook – The Limits of Armenia’s Disengagement

Armenia believes Russia and the CSTO failed to provide the obligatory support and intervention to stop Azerbaijan during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and subsequent clashes in Nagorno-Karabakh and on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border. While the CSTO did not intervene at any point because its articles do not allow for an intervention in the circumstances previously noted, Russia did provide a peacekeeping mission as part of the ceasefire agreement to end the Second

Nagorno-Karabakh War. Regardless, Armenia did not consider this an adequate response and believed the Russian peacekeepers failed to enforce the terms of the ceasefire, particularly when Azerbaijan carried out the September 2023 operation that resulted in ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh fleeing the region. As such, Armenia has taken action to disengage from Russia by ending its participation with the CSTO and taking over duties from the Russian border guards in part of its territory. Since Armenia cannot completely disengage from Russia while

the Russian 102nd Military Base and detachments of the Russian border guards remain in Armenia, its disengagement from the Russian-led CSTO and removal of some Russian border guards are actions it can take to start distancing itself from Russia.

Armenia's particular engagements with India, the United States, and France further demonstrate its pivot away from Russia. Armenia's acquisitions of new weapon systems and equipment from India and France in the past couple of years mean Armenia can rely less on Russia in this area going forward. Similarly, Armenia's security cooperation with the United States in the past year moves Armenia in a strategic direction away from Russia. Armenia does not yet have a security cooperation partnership that displaces Russia entirely, however.

Per existing agreements, the Russian 102nd Military Base and some detachments of the Russian Border Guard will remain in Armenia for the foreseeable future.

In addition to the security pivot away from Russia, Armenia has been taking steps to increase economic ties with other partners. This includes deeper economic cooperation with the EU, although it will likely take considerable time and effort to reduce Russia's economic involvement in Armenia. Until Armenia ends the presence of Russian forces in its territory, significantly reduces its economic ties with Russia, and opens economic routes with Europe, Armenia can take small steps, but likely not a giant leap away from Russia.

The Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO)
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC G-2)
Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027

[HTTPS://FMSO.TRADOC.ARMY.MIL](https://fmso.tradoc.army.mil)

The Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is part of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command G-2, whose mission is to understand, describe, assess and deliver the conditions of the operational environment. For over 30 years, FMSO has conducted open-source research on foreign perspectives of the operational environment, emphasizing those topics that are understudied or unconsidered. FMSO's products are integral to critical thinking in the Army's leadership, analytic communities, and military education, and wherever there is a professional interest in what "they think they think."

REFERENCES

- 1 Before it had become a Soviet Republic, Armenia had been a part of the Russian Empire since Russia took control of it as part of the Treaty of Turkmenchay that ended the Russo-Persian War 1826-1828. For more background, see: Maziar Behrooz, *Iran at War: Interactions with the Modern World and the Struggle with Imperial Russia*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing. 2023.
- 2 For a more extensive history of the region and the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, see: Thomas de Waal, *Black Garden*. New York: New York University Press. 2013.
- 3 "Aivazovsky, Location Nagorno-Karabakh2, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Location_Nagorno-Karabakh2.png," Public Domain.
- 4 de Waal, *Black Garden*.
- 5 Charles W. Blandy, "Azerbaijan: Is War over Nagorny Karabakh a Realistic Option?," Advanced Research and Assessment Group. Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Caucasus Series 08/17, May 2008. <https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/publications/publication.html/87342>
- 6 "Nicolay Sidorov, Artsakh Republic 1994-2020, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Artsakh_Republic_1994-2020.svg," licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International license.
- 7 Laurence Broers, "The Nagorny Karabakh Conflict: Defaulting to War," *Chatham House*, Research Paper, 11 July 2016. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/nagorny-karabakh-conflict-defaulting-war>
- 8 Ibid.
- 9 The level of development of bilateral security cooperation between Turkey and Azerbaijan could be seen in 2020, when the Turkish government deployed its F-16s to the Ganja Airbase in Azerbaijan as part of joint military exercise and has reportedly deployed them there a few times since, see: "Intel: Turkish F-16s spotted on runway in Azerbaijan," *Al-Monitor*, 9 October 2020. <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2020/10/turkey-azerbaijan-armenia-war-f16-conflict.html>
- 10 Levon Hovsepyan & Artyom A. Tonoyan, "From alliance to 'soft conquest': the anatomy of the Turkish-Azerbaijani military alliance before and after the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 35:4, 622-655. 2024.
- 11 Ronald Grigor, Suny. *They Can Live in the Desert but Nowhere Else: A History of the Armenian Genocide*. Princeton University Press. 2015.
- 12 "Armenian Foreign Ministry's Statement on the 107th Anniversary of 1915 Armenian Genocide," *Hetq*, 24 April 2022. <https://www.hetq.am/en/article/143764>; Gizem Nisa Cebi, "Türkiye remembers Turks murdered during 1915 events," *Anadolu Agency*, 24 April 2024. <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkiye/turkiye-remembers-turks-murdered-during-1915-events/3200971>
- 13 Lusine Voskanyan, "Armenian-Turkish Relations: Recent Developments And Diplomatic Engagements," *Media.am*, 1 July 2024. <https://media.am/en/verified/2024/07/01/39826/>
- 14 "Военные эксперты сочли учения Азербайджана и Турции связанными с Карабахом (Military experts have considered the exercises of Azerbaijan and Turkey are connected with Karabakh)," *Kavkazskiy Uzel*, 29 January 2021. <https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/359201/>; Faik Majid, "Аналитики в Баку оценили значение азербайджано-турецких учений (Analysts in Baku assessed the meaning of the Azerbaijan-Turkish exercise)," *Kavkazskiy Uzel* (independent Caucasus-based news website), 25 October 2023. <https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/393732>
- 15 "Strategic partnership between Armenia and Georgia will open up new opportunities for further deepening of cooperation-PM," *Armenpress*, 26 January 2024. <https://armenpress.am/en/article/1128963>; Mark Dovich, "Karabakh, gas for electricity, corridors: Exclusive with Iran's ambassador," *Civilnet*, 15 November 2023. <https://www.civilnet.am/en/news/756939/karabakh-gas-for-electricity-corridors-exclusive-with-irans-ambassador/>
- 16 Valentin Loginov, "Хоть Гюмри: Армения не сможет отказаться от российской базы до 2044-го (If only Gyumri: Armenia cannot remove the Russian base until the year 2044)," *Izvestiya*, 27 October 2023. <https://iz.ru/1595635/valentin-loginov/khot-gyumri-armeniiane-smozhet-otkazatsia-ot-rossiiskoi-bazy-do-2044-go>
- 17 Hovhannes Nazaretyan, "Russia's Increasing Military Presence in Armenia," *EVN Report*, 4 March 2021. <https://evnreport.com/politics/russia-s-increasing-military-presence-in-armenia/>
- 18 "Армения и Россия подписали договор о размещении военной базы в Гюмри (Armenia and Russia signed an agreement on the deployment of the military base in Gyumri)," *Evrasiya Expert*, 16 March 2017. <https://eurasia.expert/armeniya-i-rossiya-podpisali-dogovor-o-voennoy-baze/>
- 19 "Россия и Армения подписали соглашение об объединенной группировке войск (Russia and Armenia signed an agreement on a united defense group)," *Kommersant*, 30 November 2016. <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2411111>

- kommersant.ru/doc/3157229
- 20 Chapter Five: Russia and Eurasia, *The Military Balance*, 123:1, 171-172, DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2023.2162718. 2023.
- 21 “Expert: Armenian Iskanders will make Azerbaijan dip into its purse,” *News.am*, 25 September 2016. <http://news.am/eng/news/348207.html>
- 22 Содружество Независимых Государств (The Commonwealth of Independent States), “Органы СНГ (Bodies of the CIS), Информация об органах СНГ (Information about the organizations of the CIS), Сведения об органах СНГ (Report on the organizations of the CIS). <http://www.e-cis.info/page.php?id=2374>
- 23 One notable exception was the CIS Peacekeeping Force that deployed to Tajikistan under a Russian command in the wake of the civil war there from 1992-1997, before the CSTO came into existence, see: Andres Serrano Smith, “CIS peacekeeping in Tajikistan.” *Regional peacekeepers: The paradox of Russian peacekeeping*, edited by John Mackinlay and Peter Cross, 156-183. Tokyo, Japan: United Nations University Press. 2003.
- 24 Организация Договора о коллективной безопасности (The Collective Security Treaty Organization), “Документы, Правовая база ОДКБ, Устав Организации Договора о коллективной безопасности (Documents, Legal framework of the CSTO, The Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization),” http://www.odkb-csto.org/documents/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=124
- 25 Aleksandr Gabuyev, “СНГ поставили перед пактом (They put the CIS before a pact),” *Kommersant*, 8 October 2007. <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/812422>; “На страны ОДКБ приходится 5 проц. от общего объема российского военного экспорта (CSTO members make up 5 percent of all Russian arms exports),” Центр анализа мировой торговли оружием (Center of Analysis of World Arms Trade), 30 June 2011. <http://www.armstrade.org/includes/periodics/news/2011/0630/13208689/detail.shtml>
- 26 Adapted from “Aris Katsaris, Euler diagram of the supranational organizations composed solely of Post-Soviet states, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Supranational_PostSoviet_Bodies-en.svg,” licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International license.
- 27 Chapter Five: Russia and Eurasia, *The Military Balance*, 123:1. 2023.
- 28 For a complete list and description of joint CSTO and CIS military exercises involving Armenia and Russia, see: Matthew Stein, “Compendium of Central Asian Military and Security Activity,” 20 January 2021. community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmso-monographs/360801
- 29 Yelena Chernenko, “Генсек ОДКБ: коллективные миротворческие силы вводятся в Казахстан на непродолжительный срок (The Secretary of the CSTO: the collective peacekeeping forces are deploying to Kazakhstan for a short time period),” *Kommersant*, 6 January 2022, <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5156047>
- 30 Alexander Rybin, “Охранники инфраструктуры с боевым опытом (The guards of infrastructure with combat experience),” *Fergana Agency*, January 7, 2022, <https://fergana.agency/articles/124563/>; Alexey Kurilchenko, “Миротворческие силы ОДКБ взяли под контроль аэропорт Алма-Аты (Peacekeeping forces of the CSTO have taken control of the Almaty airport),” *Zvezda*, 7 January 2022. <https://tvzvezda.ru/news/2022171028-ifcw.html>
- 31 Организация Договора о коллективной безопасности (The Collective Security Treaty Organization), “10 января в формате видеоконференции состоялась внеочередная сессия Совета коллективной безопасности ОДКБ. Обсуждалась ситуация в Республике Казахстан и меры по нормализации обстановки в стране (An extraordinary session of the Collective Security Council of the CSTO was held on 10 January via videoconference. The situation in the Republic of Kazakhstan and measures to stabilize the country were discussed),” https://odkb-csto.org/news/news_odkb/10-yanvarya-v-formate-videokonferentsii-sostoitsya-zasedanie-soveta-kollektivnoy-bezopasnosti-odkb-p/?clear_cache=Y#loaded
- 32 “Миссия ОДКБ в Казахстане завершается 19 января (The CSTO mission in Kazakhstan is ending on 19 January),” *Eurasia Daily*, 19 January 2022. <https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2022/01/19/missiya-odkb-v-kazahstane-zavershaetsya-19-yanvarya>
- 33 “В ОДКБ рассматривают ситуацию на юге Армении как пограничный инцидент с Азербайджаном (The CSTO views the situation in the south of Armenia as a border incident with Azerbaijan),” *TASS*, 3 July 2021. <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/11814987>
- 34 Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Armenia, Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners.” <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/arm>
- 35 Arshaluys Mgdesyanyan, “Экономический разрыв с Москвой – большой вызов для Армении (The economic gap with Moscow is a major challenge for Armenia),” *Civilnet*, 26 March 2024. <https://www.civilnet.am/ru/news/769458/экономический-разрыв-с-москвой-большой-вызов-для-армении/>

- 36 “Armenia confirms rail concession award,” *Railway Gazette International*, 18 January 2008. <https://www.railwaygazette.com/news/armenia-confirms-rail-concession-award/32629.article>; Hovhannes Nazaretyan, “Armenia’s Economic Dependence on Russia: How Deep Does It Go?,” *EVN Report*, 7 July 2023. <https://evnreport.com/economy/armenias-economic-dependence-on-russia-how-deep-does-it-go/>
- 37 Kataryna Wolczuk, Rilka Dragneva, and Jon Wallace, “What is the Eurasian Economic Union?,” *Chatham House*, 15 July 2022. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/07/what-eurasian-economic-union>
- 38 “Карабах: хроника войны-2020 (Karabakh: the chronicle of the 2020 war),” *Kavkazskiy Uzel*, 15 June 2021. <https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/354861/>
- 39 Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, “Russian peacekeeping forces in Nagorno-Karabakh,” https://eng.mil.ru/en/russian_peacekeeping_forces.htm; “Миротворцы сопроводили паломников из Степанакерта в монастырь Амарас (Peacekeepers escorted pilgrims from Stepanakert to the Amaras monastery),” *Kavkazskiy Uzel*, 17 May 2021. <https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/363977/>
- 40 “Миротворцы сопроводили шесть военных колонн Азербайджана в Нагорном Карабахе (Peacekeepers escorted six columns of soldiers of Azerbaijan in Nagorno Karabakh),” *Kavkazskiy Uzel*, 3 May 2021. <https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/363522/>; “Российские миротворцы обеспечат безопасность строительства водохранилища в НКР (Russian peacekeepers are ensuring security of the construction of a water reservoir in Nagorno Karabakh),” *Eurasia Daily*, 27 August 2021. <https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2021/08/27/rossiyskie-mirotvorcy-obespechat-bezopasnost-stroitelstva-vodohranilishcha-v-nkr>; “Российские миротворцы отработали отражение провокаций в Нагорном Карабахе (Russian peacekeepers worked out repulsing provocations in Nagorno Karabakh),” *Eurasia Daily*, 14 October 2021. <https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2021/10/14/rossiyskie-mirotvorcy-otrabotali-otrazhenie-provokacyi-v-nagornom-karabahe>
- 41 Ibid.
- 42 Stepan Kocharyan, “Anti-Pashinyan demonstrators rally in “March of Dignity,”” *Armenpress*, 15 December 2020. <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1037906.html>
- 43 “Карабах: хроника войны-2020 (Karabakh: the chronicle of the 2020 war);” “Кремль отреагировал на слова Пашиняна о функциях миротворцев (The Kremlin reacted to Pashinyan’s words on the function of the peacekeepers),” *Kavkazskiy Uzel*, 5 August 2022. <https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/379832/>
- 44 Irina Tumakova, “The thing I miss the most? Freedom,” *Novaya Gazeta Europe*, 24 March 2023. <https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2023/03/24/the-thing-i-miss-the-most-freedom-en>
- 45 Mariya Shustrova, “Пашинян считает, что миротворцы из РФ не выполняют «ключевые» цели в Нагорном Карабахе (Pashinyan believes that the Russian peacekeepers are not fulfilling the “key” terms in Nagorno-Karabakh),” *Gazeta.ru*, 22 December 2022. <https://www.gazeta.ru/army/2022/12/22/15982279.shtml>
- 46 “Azerbaijan dissatisfied with Russian peacekeepers’ pro-Armenia attitude,” *Daily Sabah*, 7 January 2021. <https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/azerbaijan-dissatisfied-with-russian-peacekeepers-pro-armenia-attitude>
- 47 “Mapeh, 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire map, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2020_Nagorno-Karabakh_ceasefire_map.svg,” licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International license.
- 48 Tigran Petrosyan, “Аналитики в Ереване назвали карты Генштаба СССР негодными для делимитации границы (Analysts in Yerevan have called the maps of USSR General Staff unfit for border demarcation),” *Kavkazskiy Uzel*, 3 June 2021. <https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/364561/>; “Азербайджанцы потребовали от армянских военнослужащих прекратить инженерные работы: подробности о провокации в селе Тех (Azerbaijani demanded that Armenian soldiers halt engineering work: details on the provocation in the village of Togh),” *Armenpress*, 12 April 2023. <https://armenpress.am/rus/news/1108490.html>
- 49 “Pashinyan: Azerbaijan has established control over a certain territory,” *News.am*, 14 September 2022. <https://news.am/eng/news/720173.html>
- 50 “В ОДКБ рассматривают ситуацию на юге Армении как пограничный инцидент с Азербайджаном (The CSTO views the situation in the south of Armenia as a border incident with Azerbaijan),” *TASS*, July 3, 2021. <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/11814987>
- 51 Andrey Sapozhnikov, “Армения не будет участвовать в учениях ОДКБ (Armenia will not participate in the CSTO exercises),” *Kommersant*, 26 September 2022. <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5581954>
- 52 “Для нас принципиальную важность имеет подтверждение зоны ответственности ОДКБ в Армении: речь премьера на СКБ ОДКБ (The confirmation of the zone of responsibility of the CSTO in Armenia has the most significance for us: the address of the prime

- minister at the Special Security Council of the CSTO),” *Armenpress*, 23 November 2022. <https://armenpress.am/rus/news/1098011.html>
- 53 Irina Tumakova, “The thing I miss the most? Freedom,” *Novaya Gazeta Europe*, 24 March 2023. <https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2023/03/24/the-thing-i-miss-the-most-freedom-en>
- 54 “Начало и конец непризнанной Республики Арцах (The beginning and the end of the unrecognized Republic of Artsakh),” *Kavkazskiy Uzel*, 4 October 2023. <https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/393093>
- 55 “МИД России пояснил смену постов миротворцев адаптацией к новым условиям (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained the change to the posts of peacekeepers as adapting to the new conditions),” *Kavkazskiy Uzel*, 10 October 2023. <https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/393302>
- 56 “Joint statement on Azerbaijan’s attack on Nagorno-Karabakh,” European Parliament, “European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations with South Caucasus (DSCA), Documents, Communiqués,” 19 September 2023. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/joint-statement-on-azerbaijan-s-attack-o/product-details/20230919DPU37422>; Laman Zeynalova, “Russian peacekeepers in close touch with Armenians in Karabakh, Azerbaijani officials – MFA,” *Trend*, 19 September 2023. <https://en.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/3799355.html>
- 57 Rena Abdurakhmona, “Российские миротворцы направились из Карабаха в Армению (Russian peacekeepers have deployed from Karabakh to Armenia),” *Trend*, 23 April 2024. <https://www.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/3889409.html>
- 58 Lusine Акоруян, “Обязательства по поставкам оружия Армении не выполняют и союзнические страны – Н. Пашинян (Allied countries are not fulfilling their obligations of supplying weapons to Armenia – N. Pashinyan),” *Hetq*, 29 September 2022. <https://hetq.am/ru/article/148783>
- 59 “Главное о критике Арменией ОДКБ и Кремля (The heart of Armenia’s criticism of the CSTO and the Kremlin),” *Kavkazskiy Uzel*, 29 February 2024. <https://www.caucasianknot.com/articles/386973>
- 60 “Военный комитет ОДКБ без Армении определился с развитием Коллективных авиационных сил (The military committee of the CSTO has determined the development of the Collective aviation forces without Armenia),” *Eurasia Daily*, 12 April 2024. <https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2024/04/12/voennyy-komit-et-odkb-bez-armenii-opredelilsya-s-razvitiem-kollektivnyh-aviacionnyh-sil>; “Представители Армении не приехали на Совет министров обороны ОДКБ в Алма-Ату (Representatives of Armenia did not attend the Defense Ministers Council of the CSTO in Almaty),” *Eurasia Daily*, 31 May 2024. <https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2024/05/31/predstaviteli-armenii-ne-priehali-na-sovet-ministrov-oborony-odkb-v-alma-atu>
- 61 Nazim Kalandarov, “Армения не будет участвовать в финансировании деятельности ОДКБ в 2024 году (Armenia will not participate in financing the activities of the CSTO in 2024),” *TASS*, 8 May 2024. <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/20745687>
- 62 “Пашинян анонсировал выход Армении из ОДКБ (Pashinyan announced the departure of Armenia from the CSTO),” *Kavkazskiy Uzel*, 12 June 2024. <https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/400863>; “Пашинян заявил о невозможности возвращения Армении в ОДКБ (Pashinyan stated that Armenia’s return to the CSTO is not possible),” *Interfax*, 4 December 2024. <https://www.interfax.ru/world/995910>
- 63 “Пашинян заявил о невозможности возвращения Армении в ОДКБ (Pashinyan stated that Armenia’s return to the CSTO is not possible),” *Interfax*, 4 December 2024. <https://www.interfax.ru/world/995910>
- 64 “МИД уполномочен уведомить: Армения избегает контактов с Россией по линии МИД и МО (An official notification from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Armenia is moving away from contacts with Russia via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense),” *Eurasia Daily*, 5 June 2024. <https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2024/06/05/mid-upolnomochen-vedomit-armeniya-izbegaet-kontaktov-s-rossiye-po-linii-mid-i-mo>
- 65 “Armenia FM comments on Russian border guards’ presence on Turkey border,” *News.am*, 7 March 2024. <https://news.am/eng/news/811212.html>
- 66 “Российские пограничники сохраняют свое присутствие в Армении: кандидат на должность директора ФСБ РФ (Russian border guards will stay at their positions in Armenia: the candidate for director of the Federal Security Service of Russia),” *Armenpress*, 14 May 2024. <https://armenpress.am/ru/article/1137057>; Siranush Ghazanchyan, “Russian border troops to leave Armenia-Iran border checkpoint from January 2025,” *Public Radio of Armenia*, 8 October 2024. <https://en.armradio.am/2024/10/08/armenian-nss-border-troops-to-participate-in-the-protection-of-armenias-borders-with-turkey-and-iran/>
- 67 Lusine Акоруян, “Обязательства по поставкам оружия Армении не выполняют и союзнические страны – Н. Пашинян (Allied countries are not fulfilling their obligations of supplying weapons to Armenia – N.

- Pashinyan),” *Hetq*, 29 September 2022. <https://hetq.am/ru/article/148783>; Vahe Sarukhanyan, “\$155M for Artillery: Armenia Signs Another Arms Deal with India,” *Hetq*, 11 November 2022. <https://hetq.am/en/article/150099>
- 68 “Минобороны Армении анонсировало совместные с США учения (The Ministry of Defense of Armenia announced a joint military exercise with the U.S.),” *Kavkazskiy Uzel*, 6 July 2024. <https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/401614>
- 69 Liana Sayadyan, “U.S. State Department Official: Armenia’s CSTO Membership No Hindrance to Greater Defense Cooperation with Washington,” *Hetq*, 17 July 2024. <https://hetq.am/en/article/168189>
- 70 Tigran Petrosyan, “Армянские аналитики сочли декларативным заявление о партнерстве Армении и США (Armenian analysts looked at the declaration of the partnership of Armenia and the U.S.),” *Kavkazskiy Uzel*, 14 June 2024. <https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/400919>
- 71 Siranush Ghazanchyan, “Armenia, Greece, Cyprus sign military cooperation programs for 2024,” *Public Radio of Armenia*, 18 December 2023. <https://en.armradio.am/2023/12/18/armenia-greece-cyprus-sign-military-cooperation-programs-for-2024/>
- 72 “About European Union Mission in Armenia,” *EU Mission in Armenia*, 11 April 2024. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/euma/about-european-union-mission-armenia_en?s=410283
- 73 “France to sell Thales GM 200 radars and Mistral air defense systems to Armenia,” *Armenpress*, 24 October 2023. <https://armenpress.am/eng/news/1122654.html>
- 74 “Армения покинет ОДКБ после того, как построит автономную систему ПВО — источники (Armenia will leave the CSTO after constructing an autonomous air defense system – sources),” *Eurasia Daily*, 20 December 2023. <https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2023/12/20/armeniya-pokinet-odkb-posle-togo-kak-postroit-avtonomnyu-sistemu-pvo-istochniki>
- 75 “Уроки Карабаха: могут ли российские средства ПВО противостоять беспилотникам (Lessons of Karabakh: can Russian air defense systems counter unmanned aerial vehicles),” *News.am*, 22 December 2020. <https://news.am/rus/news/620332.html>
- 76 “Армения и Франция достигли новых договорённостей в сфере ВТС (Armenia and France reach a new agreement in the sphere of military-technical cooperation),” *Eurasia Daily*, 18 June 2024. <https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2024/06/18/armeniya-i-franciya-dostigli-novyh-dogovoryonnostey-v-sfere-vts>; “Армения договорилась с Францией о поставке самоходок Caesar (Armenia reached an agreement with France to acquire the self-propelled CAESAR),” *Kavkazskiy Uzel*, 18 June 2024. <https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/401043>
- 77 Gabriel Gavin, “EU launches €270M plan to bring Armenia into the Western fold,” *Politico.eu*, 5 April 2024. <https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-launch-new-e270-million-plan-bring-armenia-fold-russia/>
- 78 ““Bold actions can lead to serious problems,” says Armenian economist,” *JAM News*, 10 April 2024. <https://jam-news.net/armenias-trade-with-the-west/>
- 79 Map adapted from “TUBS, Armenia in Europe, [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Armenia_in_Europe_\(relief\)_\(-mini_map\).svg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Armenia_in_Europe_(relief)_(-mini_map).svg),” licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license.