

# FMSO's Military DIME (M-DIME) Research Project


*Tracking Russian and Chinese military influence in states around the world*

---

## Instruments of Russian Military Influence in Chile

Lucas Winter<sup>a</sup>, Jason Warner<sup>b</sup>, and Keven Hernandez<sup>c</sup>

---



November 2024

U.S. Army  
Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO)  
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) G2

## OVERVIEW OF FMSO'S M-DIME RESEARCH PROJECT

The Military DIME (M-DIME) Research Project is a dynamic effort from researchers at the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO). Its goal is to provide Army leaders with a clear, comparative understanding of how China and Russia employ instruments of national power to obtain military influence around the world. The M-DIME framework is derived from the "DIME" concept, which classes instruments of national power into four types: Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic. Based on this concept, the M-DIME framework gives more narrow attention to the instruments that China and Russia employ to gain military influence in third-party countries.

The M-DIME framework's purpose is to track and analyze the military influence of "Benefactor" countries (i.e. China and Russia) in select "Recipient" countries in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and South and South-east Asia. Benefactor countries are assumed to engage in activities that result in them having increased military influence in Recipient countries to gain leverage over global rivals, competitors, and adversaries; for China and Russia, this means the United States. Within this framework, "military influence" is defined as the ability of a Benefactor country to shape or alter the attitudes, behaviors, and capabilities of actors within—and entities associated with—the armed forces of Recipient countries.

**The M-DIME framework identifies 12 distinct instruments of national power employed by Benefactor countries to gain military influence in Recipient countries, three for each of the DIME categories. They are as follows:**

### DIPLOMATIC INSTRUMENTS

- D1 Defense-Related Diplomacy
- D2 International Military Education and Training
- D3 Soft Power Activities

### INFORMATIONAL INSTRUMENTS

- I1 Cultural and Media Outreach, Collaboration, and Alignment
- I2 Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Support
- I3 Cooperation in Military Intelligence and Communications

### MILITARY INSTRUMENTS

- M1 Formal Bilateral Military Engagements
- M2 Shared Informal/Multilateral Military Engagements
- M3 Defense/Security Pacts and Agreements

### ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS

- E1 Arms Transfers
- E2 Technology-Sharing and Joint Production Agreements
- E3 Trade and Cooperation in Strategic Commodities/Sectors

M-DIME analysis is based on qualitative assessments of Benefactor influence in Recipient countries along each of the 12 M-DIME instruments of influence. These assessments are made for the Benefactor's **Current Influence** (assessed as Very High, High, Medium, Low, Very Low, or Unobserved) and **Projected Influence** (assessed as Increasing, Steady, Decreasing, or Unknown). Current assessments are made based on activities from 2012 to the present, while future assessments are three-year forecasts.

The bulk of activities considered in the M-DIME Research Project involve members of the armed forces or defense sector personnel in both Benefactor and Recipient countries. Such activities include formal and informal military-to-military diplomacy, security cooperation engagements, and arms transfers. However, the M-DIME Research Project also tracks and analyzes Chinese and Russian activities that employ non-military instruments of influence but ultimately bear on the decision-making and capabilities of the Recipient country's armed forces. Such activities include Chinese and Russian collaboration with Benefactor states in media, communications technology, and strategic sectors.

The M-DIME Research Project's findings are derived from open-source research. Each M-DIME product is produced with the collaboration of analysts from across FMSO, frequently with the assistance of non-Department of Defense subject matter experts coming from academia, think tanks, and the private sector. Given its basis in open-source research, the M-DIME Research Project has an inherent limitation. It cannot track Chinese and Russian military influence activities that are deliberately kept secret. Consequently, assessments of Chinese and Russian influence based on instruments for which secrecy is important or where information would typically be classified by the Benefactor or Recipient countries—for instance, military-technology sharing or intelligence collaboration—are acknowledged to be made with low confidence. Assessments of **Projected Influence**, unless otherwise stated, are also made with low confidence given pervasive information gaps and the potential for bilateral dynamics to quickly shift. In certain cases, assessments are not made where open-source data is considered inconclusive

In sum, the M-DIME Research Project is a tool for U.S. Army and U.S. Government personnel to better understand the instruments of national power employed by China and Russia to gain global military influence and the impact these activities have on U.S. national security interests. Over time, FMSO will expand the body of research and assessments based on this framework, increasing its comparative value across Benefactor and Recipient countries.

## KEY ASSESSMENTS

**Russia’s current M-DIME influence in Chile is assessed as Very Low.** The only important instrument contributing to Russia’s current military influence in Chile is:



**Trade and Cooperation in Strategic Commodities/Sectors (E3).** Russia has taken an interest in Chile’s lithium industry. Lithium is a critical mineral for the clean energy transition and will be an important catalyst in many countries’ future economies. Compared to the other instruments, this is the one that Russia could readily take advantage of given the prospect of state-led initiatives—such as those by Rosatom, a state-owned nuclear corporation, with a presence in other Latin American countries like Bolivia.<sup>1</sup> Russia has yet to penetrate Chile’s market to the same extent as China because of political and economic constraints.

**Russia’s projected M-DIME influence in Chile is assessed as Steady.** The only dynamic instrument informing Russia’s projected military influence in Chile is:



**Trade and Cooperation in Strategic Commodities/Sectors (E3).** Russia has attempted to penetrate Chile’s strategic commodities sector with minimal success. It remains possible this could change once President Gabriel Boric leaves office in 2026.

DIPLOMATIC / INFORMATION			MILITARY / ECONOMIC		
	<b>D1</b>	Defense-Related Diplomacy		<b>M1</b>	Formal Bilateral Military Engagements
	<b>D2</b>	International Military Education and Training		<b>M2</b>	Shared Informal/Multilateral Military Engagements
	<b>D3</b>	Soft Power Activities		<b>M3</b>	Defense/Security Pacts and Agreements
	<b>I1</b>	Cultural/Media Outreach, Collaboration, Alignment		<b>E1</b>	Arms Transfers
	<b>I2</b>	Information/Communications Technology Support		<b>E2</b>	Technology-Sharing, Joint Production Agreements
	<b>I3</b>	Cooperation in Military Intelligence/Communications		<b>E3</b>	Trade/Cooperation in Strategic Commodities/Sectors

CURRENT DEGREE OF INFLUENCE						PROJECTED FUTURE DEGREE OF INFLUENCE		
Very High	High	Medium	Low	Very Low	None/Unobserved	Increasing	Steady	Decreasing

## INTRODUCTION TO RUSSIA-CHILE RELATIONS

Chile-Russia relations have historically been minimal. In early September 1970, a Marxist leader, Salvador Allende, narrowly won a contested election in Chile, causing alarm in Washington.<sup>2</sup> Interestingly, when Allende was in power, the Soviet Union did not significantly expand military or economic relations with Chile.<sup>3</sup> The Allende government almost received weaponry from the Soviet Union but the weapons were diverted to a different country when Soviet intelligence realized a coup d'état was imminent.<sup>45</sup> During the Pinochet era (1973-1990), the junta's persecution of communists and socialists prevented any diplomatic or military relationship from developing between the two countries.<sup>6</sup> The close relationship fostered between the Pinochet regime and the United States—albeit rocky at times—has remained despite Russia restoring diplomatic relations with Chile in 1990 after Pinochet stepped down.<sup>7</sup>

U.S.-Chilean military relations remain strong, with Santiago and Washington seeking to extend their cooperation, which dates to World War II. Chile has historically purchased most of its arms and supplies from the United States.<sup>8</sup> Today, the level and number of interactions between military officials of both countries are substantial; in 2023, General James C. McConville, chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, visited the Chilean Army to strengthen military relations.<sup>9</sup> Expansive military engagement between the U. S. and Chilean militaries is also noted by the exchange of military attachés, academic training, and joint exercises, which includes the annual Southern Star exercise.<sup>10</sup> The United States expects to expand its lithium trade with Chile as part of its “friendshoring” strategy to diversify supply chains with its allies as opposed to relying on China; currently, the U.S. imports about \$120 million of lithium from Chile compared to \$5.78 billion from China.<sup>11</sup>

CHILE AT A GLANCE	
Capital	Santiago <sup>12</sup>
Population	18,549,457 <sup>13</sup>
GDP per Capita	\$25,400 <sup>14</sup>
Head of Government	President Gabriel Boric <sup>15</sup>
Head of State	President Gabriel Boric <sup>16</sup>
Minister of Defense	Maya Fernández Allende <sup>17</sup>
Chief of General Staff	Jean Pierre Desgroux Ycaza <sup>18</sup>
Military Expenditure (total)	\$5.74 billion <sup>19</sup>
Military Expenditure (% of GDP)	1.6% <sup>20</sup>
Armed Service Branches	Armed Forces of Chile (Fuerzas Armadas de Chile): Chilean Army (Ejército de Chile), Chilean Navy (Armada de Chile, includes marine units and coast guard or Maritime Territory and Merchant Marine Directorate (Directemar)), Chilean Air Force (Fuerza Aerea de Chile) <sup>21</sup>
Active Armed Forces Personnel	80,000 active armed forces personnel (45,000 Army; 25,000 Navy; 10,000 Air Force); approximately 50,000 Carabineros <sup>22</sup> (2023) <sup>23</sup>

## D - Diplomatic Instruments

Russian military-diplomatic influence in Chile has been relatively absent compared to Moscow's activity in Cuba, Bolivia, and Venezuela. The bilateral relationship between Chile and the United States limits significant Russian influence, especially given the current government in power in Santiago.



### D1: Defense-Related Diplomacy

**Current Influence: Very Low**

**Projected Influence: Steady**

- **Military cooperation agreements and security relations between Russia and Chile are inconsequential given Chile's defense cooperation with the United States.**
  - » During a 2015 meeting in Moscow between the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, Hernando Muñoz Valenzuela, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Chile's interest in strengthening military cooperation with Moscow was discussed but no further details were given in regards to specific military cooperation.<sup>24</sup>
- **The influence Russia has with Chile is demonstrated by the lack of diplomatic ties Russian officials have secured as compared to other countries in the region.**
  - » Foreign Minister Lavrov completed a four-country tour of Latin America in April 2023. He met with the heads of state of Brazil, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba, but not Chile.
- **Russia's influence via this instrument is projected to be steady.**
  - » President Boric's staunch opposition to Russia's invasion of Ukraine will hamper Moscow's military and diplomatic influence the next three years; the 2025 presidential election might alter this dynamic.
  - » Continued defense-related diplomacy with the United States will provide a bulwark against any attempted Russian engagement in this sphere.



### D2: International Military Education and Training Programs

**Current Influence: Very Low**

**Projected Influence: Steady**

- **There were signs of limited interaction between Russian and Chilean military officials for this instrument under the second Bachelet presidency (2014-2018). However, this did not alter the relationship with the United States; some interactions with Russia even included the United States.**
  - » It was reported in 2016 that the Chilean Army was exploring professional exchanges with the Russian Army, including training military personnel, joint scientific collaboration, and sharing military health matters.<sup>25</sup> Related to this effort, then-Commander-in-chief of the Chilean Army visited Moscow to meet with his counterpart, Oleg Salyukov. Little follow-on engagement has resulted from these discussions.
  - » In 2017, Russia's troops purportedly trained alongside those of Chile and Argentina.<sup>26</sup> Also that year, representatives from Russian military schools attended a "Congress of Education," led by Chilean Colonel Cristián Guedelhoefer, alongside military officials from the U.S., Peru, the UK, New Zealand, and Mexico, among others, where best practices regarding the evolution of officer training academies were discussed.<sup>27</sup>
- **The projected influence for this instrument is expected to remain steady over the next three years.**
  - » Official and publicized military education and training programs between Russia and Chile have appeared to be absent since 2018.
  - » Military education cooperation with the United States is expected to continue apace, however, with the interoperability of both their armed forces prioritized.<sup>28</sup>



### D3: Soft Power Activities

**Current Influence: Very Low**

**Projected Influence: Steady**

- **Military soft power activities between Russia and Chile have involved weapon exhibitions and other activities that demonstrate minimal levels of influence for this instrument. These interactions are now several years old, having taken place before President Boric assumed power.**
  - » In April 2017, a navy delegation from Chile visited Russia to inspect new warships in Saint Petersburg.<sup>29</sup> There was a pronouncement of military cooperation between the two navies during the visit.<sup>30</sup> That same year, under the center-left administration of Michelle Bachelet, Chile was open to striking a naval cooperation agreement with Russia, but these developments never materialized.<sup>31</sup> This most likely was due to the election of conservative president, Sebastian Pinera, in 2017.<sup>32</sup>

- » The 2016 international maritime exhibition called EXPONAVAL was held in Chile for prospective buyers from Latin America. Rosoboronexport (part of Rostec State Corporation) presented 200 submarines, icebreakers, and warships during the exhibition.<sup>33</sup> Rosoboronexport also took part in EXPONAVAL-2018.<sup>34</sup>
- » Also in 2016, Russia sent about 15 state-affiliated companies like Almaz-Antey—a producer of air defense products—Russian Aircraft Corp MiG, Russian Helicopters, Bazalt, and Rosoboronexport to one of Latin America’s largest international aerospace shows in Chile, International Air and Space Fair (FIDAE)-2016.<sup>35</sup> Russia also participated in FIDAE-2018.
- » Russian officials attended the 19th International Military Ski Championship in 2018 held in Chile.<sup>36</sup>
- » The Chilean Ministry of Defense withdrew the Russian invitation to participate in the International Air and Space Show of 2022 due to the war in Ukraine.<sup>37</sup>
- ***Russia’s soft power influence is expected to remain steadily insignificant as Chile’s armed forces continue to collaborate with U.S. armed forces.***
  - » U.S. Army South and the Chilean military have held repeated exchanges spanning health, logistics, justice, aviation, intelligence, and science and technology over the years.
  - » In 2015 military and non-governmental organizations of the United States and Chile conducted a Civil-Military Relations Professional Development Exchange seminar.<sup>38</sup>
  - » In 2023, the Chilean Army took part in a cybersecurity exercise with the Texas National Guard. Chile has participated in the Department of Defense’s National Guard Bureau State Partnership Program since 2008, which includes cybersecurity exercises like these.



# I - Informational Instruments

Russian influence via this instrument is trivial, especially when compared with the extent to which Russian media sources have permeated other Latin American countries. Russia and Chile have not struck any ICT agreements. This will limit any attempt by Russia to increase its influence in Chile using informational instruments.



## I1: Cultural and Media Outreach, Collaboration, and Alignment

**Current Influence: Very Low**

**Projected Influence: Steady**

- **Russia has an insignificant role within Chilean media, and Russian-Chile media collaboration does appear to exist.**
  - » President Boric has emphasized the importance of democracy while speaking out against Russia's invasion of Ukraine.<sup>39</sup>
  - » Russian interference in Chilean elections and protests have been documented by U.S. State Department analysts, with a spike in activity originating from Russian-linked Twitter (now referred to as X) accounts during the October protests in 2019 and recent elections.<sup>40</sup>
  - » Roughly 46 percent of Chileans believe Russia does not respect individual freedoms, according to a 2017 Pew Research poll.<sup>41</sup>
  - » According to a 2022 Statista analysis, 73 percent of Chileans think that the Ukrainian war would affect their country "quite a lot or a lot." No specific questions were asked regarding how the war would affect Chile.<sup>42</sup>
  - » The Russian Embassy notes that bilateral relations are improving regarding cultural outreach without citing specifics.<sup>43</sup>
  - » Sputnik Mundo, which often disseminates propaganda, has an audience in Chile, though smaller than its audience in Argentina or Brazil.<sup>44</sup>
- **Russia's projected influence with this instrument is projected to remain steady.**
  - » President Boric's stance on the Russian invasion of Ukraine will severely limit any cultural and media outreach Russia pursues.
  - » Cultural outreach between the United States and Chile is rich in comparison, particularly regarding educational exchanges.
  - » The U.S. Embassy in Chile has promoted the expansion of Binational Centers/Chilean North American Institutes and American Corners in Chile, that are littered across different regions of the country.<sup>45</sup>



## I2: Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Support

**Current Influence: Very Low**

**Projected Influence: Steady**

- **There have been no signed agreements between Russia and Chile in the ICT sector and there is very little Russian influence in this area based on open-source information.**
  - » In 2019 Russia's State Space Corporation planned to deploy an optical-electronic monitoring station in Chile ostensibly to provide early warning for space debris or other dangerous events in outer space.<sup>46</sup> In 2021 this initiative was halted by Russia due to Chile not possessing the "authority with respective government powers on fulfilling the provisions of an intergovernmental agreement on space"<sup>47</sup> and in part due to the uncertainty of Chile's 2021 elections.<sup>48</sup>
  - » Purportedly, there is a network based in Santiago led by former senior Soviet intelligence officials, which provides a hub for surveillance, electronic intelligence, and cryptology capabilities for the entire region.<sup>49</sup>
    - ◇ This network of front companies was established in 1998 as the Russian National Committee for the Promotion of Economic Trade with Countries of Latin America or NK SESLA.
    - ◇ Russian President Vladimir Putin tasked a member within the NK SESLA network in 2016 to build a multimillion secure communications network for the Russian military. This network is supposedly tasked with monitoring and preventing cyberattacks.
    - ◇ Based on open-source intelligence, the Chilean state does not interact with this network.
- **Russian influence in this area is projected to remain steady due to the lack of political support for striking any ICT agreements.**





### I3: Cooperation in Military Intelligence and Communications

*Current Influence: Unobserved*

*Projected Influence: Unknown*

- *There is no evidence suggesting that Chile and Russia engage in sharing military intelligence or communications.*
- *Russia-Chilean military communications are expected to remain steady in the next three years as Chile engages more with the United States regarding information sharing within the confines of the U.S.-Chile Political-Military Dialogue led by the U.S. Department of State.<sup>50</sup>*
  - » A Chilean Army intelligence delegation visited Fort Hood in 2014 to discuss future intelligence sharing with the United States enhancing interoperability and learning about the U.S. intelligence doctrine. Various intelligence-gathering platforms were also examined.<sup>51</sup>

# M - Military Instruments

This instrument has yielded minimal cooperation between Chile and Russia given the depth and breadth of Santiago's security cooperation with the U.S. Russia's lack of military influence demonstrates the value Chile accords to the U.S. military relationship for technical, political, and practical reasons. Chile only indirectly interacted with the Russian military through various observational activities before President Boric assumed power in 2022.



## M1: Formal Bilateral Military Engagements

**Current Influence: Unobserved**

**Projected Influence: Unknown**

- ***There has been no identifiable open-source evidence of bilateral engagement via this instrument since 2012.***
- ***As a result, Russia's future project influence via this instrument is unknown.***
  - » On the other hand, U.S. Southern Command Commander General Laura Richardson and Chilean authorities have signaled a willingness to continue with more military exercises into the future.<sup>52</sup>
  - » The first iteration of Southern Vanguard—a U.S. Southern Command-sponsored multinational exercise to increase interoperability between U.S. and Western Hemisphere forces—took place in Chile in 2021.<sup>53</sup> This was the first instance in which the United States sent a company-sized force (the largest U.S. Army contingent ever) to train alongside the Chilean Army's 3rd Mountain Division. This division is specialized in mountain warfare and survival, and shared its expertise on conducting military operations in high-altitude and cold-weather environments.<sup>54</sup>
  - » Exercise Southern Star, led by Chile, is an annual joint special operations exercise where U.S. forces collaborate with their Chilean counterparts to learn new skills in dealing with counterterrorism and other asymmetric threats.<sup>55</sup>
  - » A joint cooperation agreement was signed between the United States and Chile in 2023 to explore how future defense projects could be set up between the countries' respective armed forces and defense ministries.<sup>56</sup>



## M2: Shared Informal/Multilateral Military Engagements

**Current Influence: Unobserved**

**Projected Influence: Unknown**

- ***There is no identifiable open-source evidence of engagement via this instrument since 2012.***
- ***The absence of multilateral military engagements between Russia and Chile is not expected to change as Washington and Santiago continue to strengthen their military relationship, typified by the defense agreements struck.***<sup>57</sup>



## M3: Defense/Security Pacts and Agreements

**Current Influence: Very Low**

**Projected Influence: Steady**

- ***Russia and Chile have had limited engagements using the defense and security pact instrument.***
  - » In 2014, the Chilean Senate ratified a decree of technical and military cooperation with Russia, which is assumed to still be in force.<sup>58</sup>
  - » Article 1 states that military/technical cooperation will be achieved in the supply, modernization, and repair of military equipment and arms, including radar, electronic, navigation, and aeronautics systems. Scientific collaboration and specialized exchanges in this realm, as well as joint fabrication of military equipment for third parties, are also mentioned.<sup>59</sup>
  - » The document stipulates that confidentiality should be heeded when discussing any aspect of the agreement, so it is unclear the level of cooperation or significance of the memorandum.
- ***Security and military collaboration between the United States and Chile virtually guarantees that no defense pacts or agreements will be struck with Russia, within the next three years.***
  - » Regarding American engagement, in January 2023 the Chilean Senate approved a joint cooperation agreement for research, development, testing, and the evaluation of defense projects between the United States and Chile.<sup>60</sup>

# E - Economic Instruments

Chile's economic relationship with Russia has been cooperative but has lagged behind its economic relationship with China or the U.S. The same goes for military associations linked to economic influence, given that defense cooperation between the United States and Chile also affects this instrument. Russia has sought to tap into Chile's lithium industry but has failed to do so for political and technical reasons.



## E1: Arms Transfers

**Current Influence: Very Low**

**Projected Influence: Steady**

- **Russia has attempted to extend its influence via this instrument but has made minimal headway because of Chile's prioritization of military ties with the United States. As such, there have been no significant arms transfers found between Russia and Chile since 2012.**
  - » Arms transfers between Russia and Chile are expected to remain inconsequential as Santiago imports the majority of its arms from other sources.<sup>61</sup>
  - » However, it is possible that some interactions between Chile's Fabricas y Maestranzas del Ejercito, a defense industrial arms manufacturer that aids the Chilean military, and Russian state companies may have occurred at some point or are still ongoing.<sup>62</sup>
  - » In 2014, Russia offered Chile KAMAZ and Ural vehicles, Yak-130 aircraft, and small arms that include Kalashnikov assault rifles.<sup>63</sup> Chile responded with interest in the small arms and the Yak-130 operational trainers.<sup>64</sup> This same year, Chile was interested in purchasing "Podsolnukh-E" over-the-horizon radar stations, the Igla-S man-portable air defense system, and negotiations regarding the acquisition of six Mi-17 helicopters.<sup>65</sup> No news reports suggested that this took place. Yak-130s, as of 2021, have been reportedly under negotiation based on marketing details.<sup>66</sup>
  - » In 2017, according to TASS, Chile was interested in securing Russian Ansat helicopters, but had no progress according to open-source information.<sup>67</sup>
  - » In 2018, Russia sold over \$21,000 worth of arms and ammunition to Chile.<sup>68</sup> Just under \$20,000 of that package involved spring, air/gas guns, pistols, and truncheons.<sup>69</sup>
  - » Around this time, an analysis of government transparency reports in Chile listed "several meetings with Chilean defense officials to discuss selling helicopters, submarine-detection technology, and antitank missiles."<sup>70</sup>
- **Russia's influence in the next three years via this instrument is expected to remain steady, with no agreements expected due to the present Chilean government's lack of interest. Chile's arms industry is dependent on U.S., Australian, and UK military engagement.**



## E2: Technology-Sharing and Joint Production Agreements

**Current Influence: Unobserved**

**Projected Influence: Unknown**

- **There is no identifiable open-source evidence of engagement via this instrument between Russia and Chile since 2012. Joint development of weapons platforms, systems, and equipment is nonexistent.**
- **Technology-sharing agreements between Russia and Chile are expected to remain unobserved in the next three years.**
  - » The United States and Chile have a bilateral Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement that dates to 1992.<sup>71</sup> While this accord has no military dimension, the robustness of U.S. defense collaboration and the presence of American defense contractors in Chile facilitates the sharing of military technology, demonstrated by Lockheed Martin's contracts to upgrade Chile's inventory of F-16s.<sup>72</sup>



## E3: Trade and Cooperation in Strategic Commodities/Sectors

**Current Influence: Low**

**Projected Influence: Steady**

- **Russia's current influence in Chile's strategic commodities sectors is assessed to be low. Moscow has demonstrated interest in the country's strategic lithium sector and business interactions have occurred but have been hampered by Chile's business environment and President Boric's government.**
  - » In 2018, Russia and Chile signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for cooperation in the nuclear and lithium sectors; according to the agreement, Chile's research reactor would undergo modernization and life extension.<sup>73</sup> This MoU between Rosatom America Latina, a regional branch of the Russian enter-

prise, Rosatom, and the Chilean Commission of Nuclear Energy (a government agency) was “to promote cooperation in the Chilean nuclear and lithium sector.”<sup>74</sup>

- » In 2019, a subsidiary of Rosatom—Uranium One Group—signed a preliminary agreement or MoU with Canada’s Wealth Minerals to buy 51 percent of a lithium project in Atacama.<sup>75</sup> Chile is one of the world’s biggest producers of lithium and the largest in Latin America. The Atacama salt flat is home to about one-third of the world’s lithium supply.<sup>76</sup> Talks petered out in 2019.<sup>77</sup> The long tender process and the eventual election of Boric caused the Russians to pull out.
- ***Russia’s use of this instrument is projected to remain at a steady level for the next few years. Although Chile has suspended the shipment of lithium products to Russia, Russia’s military sector seems likely to continue showing interest in this area.***
  - » In 2022, Chile (and Argentina) suspended lithium carbonate shipments to Russia; in 2021, Chile exported over 6,000 metric tons of lithium carbonate to Russia, accounting for 68 percent of total lithium carbonate imports.
  - » The Lithium Triangle, with Argentina and Bolivia, is a space that should be closely observed. Chile has successfully transformed most of its lithium resources into “economically viable reserves available for commercial production, in contrast to Argentina and Bolivia.”<sup>78</sup> Due to that, as well as the usefulness of such a commodity, Russia could theoretically look for ways to improve its influence in Chile’s lithium sector to attain this critical mineral, as Russia does not produce raw lithium.<sup>79</sup>
  - » Given the business climate and the amount of time it takes for contracts to be negotiated this potential inflection point is expected to be far into the future.
  - » In the next three years, Santiago’s orientation away from Moscow will limit any Russian advances in this sector. It is possible that after three years—when Boric leaves office—Russian companies like Rosatom may maneuver toward this space and strike business deals.

## CONCLUSIONS

**Russia's current M-DIME influence in Chile is assessed as Very Low.** Russia faces obstacles to gaining military influence in Chile using the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments in question. Perhaps the most variable and most conducive instrument for Moscow may be its limited influence in Chile's lithium industry (E3). Chile boasts the world's largest reserves of the strategic resource and is the second biggest producer.<sup>80</sup> The U.S.-based company Albemarle Corp. currently is a major player in Chile's lithium industry. Albemarle and SQM, a Chilean lithium company, are the only two lithium producers in Chile.<sup>81</sup> The United States also has a free trade agreement with Chile that will benefit any "green stimulus program" enacted by Washington, generating more demand for Chile's lithium.<sup>82</sup> The economic and defense ties between the United States and Chile will severely limit what Moscow can accomplish through investment or buyouts.

**Russia's projected M-DIME influence in Chile is assessed as Steady. In the next three years, Russia's projected influence in Chile is expected to focus on economic instruments.** Russia has attempted to break through in the strategic lithium commodities sector (E3) with limited success, hampered by the current administration's policies. With only a few years left in his presidency, President Boric is unlikely to undertake any major changes to Chile's bilateral relationship with Russia. His stance against the Ukrainian invasion is expected to persist, thus preventing any near-term warming of ties.<sup>83</sup> Further, Chile prizes the defense relationship that has historically existed with the United States. It would take remarkable changes for this to reverse to the point where Russia could have a breakthrough with Chile. The vitality of Chile's democratic and electoral institutions ensures that Chilean leadership will constantly change so that any friendlier defense policy with Russia may be short-lived and revert to the historical norm. Thus, it is highly unlikely that Russia or Chile will positively engage the other militarily via the instruments in the foreseeable future.

- 1 Ekaterina Bouckley, "Russia aims to supply 3.5% of world's lithium by mid-decade," S&P Global Commodity Insights, September 25, 2020, <https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/metals/092520-russia-aims-to-supply-35-of-worlds-lithium-by-mid-decade>.
- 2 James Doubek, "The U.S. set the stage for a coup in Chile. It had unintended consequences at home," NPR, September 10, 2023, <https://www.npr.org/2023/09/10/1193755188/chile-coup-50-years-pinochet-kissinger-human-rights-allende/>.
- 3 Joseph L. Noguee and John W. Sloan, "Allende's Chile and the Soviet Union: A Policy Lesson for Latin American Nations Seeking Autonomy," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 21, no. 3 (1979): 339-68, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/165728>; Central Intelligence Agency, *The Soviets Abandon Allende*, 1998, [https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC\\_0000307740.pdf](https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000307740.pdf).
- 4 Nikolai Leonov, "Soviet Intelligence In Latin America During the Cold War," (lecture, Estudios Públicos, January 01, 1999), <https://www.hacer.org/pdf/Leonov00.pdf>; Doubek, "coup in Chile."
- 5 At some point in the late 1970s, Chile managed to obtain a few T-55 tanks from the Soviet Union. William Horacek, "Between a Bear and an Eagle: Soviet Arms and the U.S. Response in Peru." Graduate Thesis, West Virginia University, 2017), 1-76. <https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6862&context=etd>.
- 6 Julia Gurganus and Eugene Rumer, "Russia's Global Ambitions in Perspective," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, February 20, 2019, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/02/20/russia-s-global-ambitions-in-perspective-pub-78067>; "Pinochet's Chile," *The Washington Post*, accessed November 15, 2023, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inat/longterm/pinochet/overview.htm>.
- 7 "Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's article for the Rossiyskaya Gazeta on the 50th anniversary of the Chilean military coup, September 11, 2023," *The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation*, November 09, 2023, [https://mid.ru/en/foreign\\_policy/news/1903876/](https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1903876/).
- 8 "Chile Denies Arms Credit Of \$50-Million From Soviet," *The New York Times*, October 22, 1971, <https://www.nytimes.com/1971/10/22/archives/chile-denies-arms-credit-of-50million-from-soviet.html>.
- 9 Guillermo Saavedra, "US and Chile Strengthen Ties of Friendship and Collaboration," *Diálogo América*, April 05, 2023, <https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/us-and-chile-strengthen-ties-of-friendship-and-collaboration/>.
- 10 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearing To Receive Testimony On The Posture Of United States Northern Command And United States Southern Command In Review Of The Defense Authorization Request For Fiscal Year 2024 And The Future Years Defense Program, 118th Cong.*, 1st sess., 2023, <https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/download/transcript-3232023?download=1>.
- 11 <https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-product/lithium-carbonates/reporter/chl>; <https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/yellen-visits-us-lithium-site-chile-eyes-progress-green-transition-2024-03-02/>; <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-us-wants-to-end-its-reliance-on-chinese-lithium-its-policies-are-doing-the-opposite/>.
- 12 "Chile," *CIA Factbook*, April 03, 2024, <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/chile/>.
- 13 Ibid.
- 14 Ibid.
- 15 Ibid.
- 16 Ibid.
- 17 "Maya Alejandra Fernández Allende," *National Congressional Library of Chile*, accessed November 05, 2023. [https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/resenas\\_biograficas/wiki/Maya\\_Alejandra\\_Fern%C3%A1ndez\\_Allend](https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/resenas_biograficas/wiki/Maya_Alejandra_Fern%C3%A1ndez_Allend).
- 18 Michela Cavallone, "Cambio De Mando Del Estado Mayor Conjunto," *Fuerza Aérea de Chile*, November 20, 2023, [https://www.fach.mil.cl/noticias/2023/noviembre/20\\_emco/20\\_emco.html](https://www.fach.mil.cl/noticias/2023/noviembre/20_emco/20_emco.html); *Estado Mayor Conjunto (@EmcoChile)*, "Con ocasión del 81 aniversario del Estado Mayor Conjunto, el Comandante en Jefe del @Ejercito\_Chile, GDE. Javier Iturriaga del Campo, extendió un saludo protocolar al Jefe del @EmcoChile, GAV. Jean Pierre Desgroux Ycaza," X, July 07, 2023, 11:23am, ; "Richardson en Chile: el Comando Sur reafirma el valor estratégico de la Antártida," *Escenario Mundial*, April 21, 2023, <https://www.escenariomundial.com/2023/04/21/richardson-en-chile-el-comando-sur-reafirma-el-valor-estrategico-de-la-antartida/>.
- 19 "Military expenditure of Chile from 2013 to 2022," *Statista*, February 06, 2024, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/794477/military-spending-chile/#:~:text=Chile%3A%20military%20spending%202013%2D2022&text=In%202022%2C%20the%20government%20of,dollars%20on%20the%20military%20sector>.
- 20 *CIA Factbook*, "Chile."
- 21 Ibid.
- 22 *Carbineros are a national law enforcement gendarmerie*. See: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carabineros\\_de\\_Chile](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carabineros_de_Chile)
- 23 Ibid.
- 24 "Chile interested in military cooperation with Russia, interaction with EAEU – FM," *TASS*, April 15, 2020, <https://tass.com/russia/790438>; "Speech and answers to media questions by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov during a joint press conference following negotiations with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Chile E. Muñoz, Moscow, April 20, 2015," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation*, April 20, 2015, [https://mid.ru/ru/foreign\\_policy/news/1507605/?lang=en](https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1507605/?lang=en).
- 25 *Chilean Army*, "Ejército De Chile Explora Realizar Intercambio Profesional Con Ejército Ruso," June 20, 2016. <https://www.ejercito.cl/prensa/visor/ejercito-de->



- chile-explora-realizar-intercambio-profesional-con-ejercito-ruso.
- 26 Marko Djurica, “Why Is Russia Holding So Many Army War Drills With Other Countries?” *Newsweek*, September 29, 2017, <https://www.newsweek.com/why-russia-holding-so-many-army-war-drills-other-countries-674489>.
- 27 Chilean Army, “Comienza Congreso De Educación En La Escuela Militar,” March 14, 2017, <https://www.ejercito.cl/prensa/visor/comienza-congreso-de-educacion-en-la-escuela-militar>.
- 28 Daniel M. Sickles, Dennis C. Guy, and Oscar Martinez, “Chile’s Joint Initiative with the US: Implications and lessons learned for Joint Multinational Relationships,” *Journal of the Americas* 5, no. 2 (2023): 95-108. [https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/JOTA/journals/Volume-5\\_Issue-2/27-Sickles\\_eng-w.pdf?ver=yVBR\\_bqnmCHJ\\_i7QsdK5gQ%3D%3D&timestamp=1694877889591](https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/JOTA/journals/Volume-5_Issue-2/27-Sickles_eng-w.pdf?ver=yVBR_bqnmCHJ_i7QsdK5gQ%3D%3D&timestamp=1694877889591).
- 29 “Chile’s Navy delegation visits Russia’s new warships for the first time,” *The Santiago Times*, April 15, 2017, <https://santiagotimes.cl/2017/04/15/chiles-navy-delegation-visits-russias-new-warships-for-the-first-time/>.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 Evan Ellis, “Russian Engagement in Latin America: An Update,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 19, 2017, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-engagement-latin-america-update>; Augusto César Dall’Agnol, Boris Perius Zabolotsky, and Fabiano Mielniczuk, “The Return of the Bear? Russian Military Engagement in Latin America: The Case of Brazil,” *Military Review*, March-April 2019, <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/Mar-Apr-2019/128-Russia-LATAM/>.
- 32 Ellis, “Russian Engagement in Latin America.”
- 33 “Rosoboronexport Will Present Warships, Submarines And Icebreakers At The Naval Exhibition In Chile,” Rosoboronexport, November 29, 2016, <http://roe.ru/press-centr/press-relizi/rosoboroneksport-predstavita-voenno-morskoy-vystavke-v-chili-boevye-korablipodlodki-i-ledokoly/>.
- 34 “Exponaval-2018,” Rosoboronexport, December 01, 2018, <http://roe.ru/press-centr/vystavki/eksponaval-2018-announcement/>; Pamela Squella, “Exponaval 2018: Más 150 empresas expositoras y buques de las marinas más poderosas del mundo,” *Defensa.com*, October 15, 2018, <https://www.defensa.com/exponaval-18/exponaval-2018-mas-150-empresas-expositoras-buques-marinas-mas>.
- 35 “Russian weaponry selling best in Latin America,” TASS, March 30, 2016, <https://tass.com/defense/866023>.
- 36 Ejército de Chile (@Ejercito\_Chile), “En el Cuartel #Portillo de la Escuela de Montaña del Ejército, se inauguró el XIX Campeonato Internacional de Esquí Militar, que reúne a #Chile, #Brasil, #Argentina y #Rusia. @Ejercito\_Arg @exercitooficial,” X, August 02, 2018, 1:04pm, [https://x.com/ejercito\\_chile/status/1025064925851471872?lang=ca](https://x.com/ejercito_chile/status/1025064925851471872?lang=ca).
- 37 “Chile excludes Russian companies from Latin America’s largest Air and Space Show, MercoPress, March 07, 2022. <https://en.mercopress.com/2022/03/07/chile-excludes-russian-companies-from-latin-america-s-largest-air-and-space-show>.
- 38 Mahlet Tesfaye, “Civil-Military relations to strengthen U.S. Army South and Chile’s bond,” U.S. Army, September 04, 2015, [https://www.army.mil/article/155052/civil\\_military\\_relations\\_to\\_strengthen\\_u\\_s\\_army\\_south\\_and\\_chiles\\_bond](https://www.army.mil/article/155052/civil_military_relations_to_strengthen_u_s_army_south_and_chiles_bond).
- 39 Peter J. Meyer and Ramon Miro, “Chile: An Overview,” Congressional Research Service, June 15, 2023, <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10880/11>.
- 40 Jakes, “As Protests in South America Surged.”
- 41 “Margaret Vice, “Publics Worldwide Unfavorable Toward Putin, Russia,” Pew Research Center, August 16, 2017, <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2017/08/16/publics-worldwide-unfavorable-toward-putin-russia/>.
- 42 “How much do you think that the Russia-Ukraine war could affect Chile?” Statista, March 2022, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1294481/opinion-how-much-russia-ukraine-war-could-affect-chile/>.
- 43 “Relaciones ruso-chilenas: estado actual,” Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Chile, accessed October 25, 2023, [https://chile.mid.ru/es/rusia-chile/relaciones\\_ruso-chilenas\\_hoy/](https://chile.mid.ru/es/rusia-chile/relaciones_ruso-chilenas_hoy/).
- 44 Diego C. Soliz T. “From Counter-Hegemonic Dialogue to Illiberal Understanding: Russian-Latin American Relations (2000-2023),” *Journal of Illiberalism Studies*, May 08, 2023, <https://www.illiberalism.org/from-counter-hegemonic-dialogue-to-illiberal-understanding-russian-latin-american-relations-2000-2023/>.
- 45 Juan Pablo Luna and Bruna Fonseca de Barros, “U.S. Engagement in Chile: A Rich History of Academic Exchange,” Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, October 15, 2023, [https://www.american.edu/centers/latin-american-latino-studies/upload/chile-educational-exchanges\\_case-vignette.pdf](https://www.american.edu/centers/latin-american-latino-studies/upload/chile-educational-exchanges_case-vignette.pdf).
- 46 “Russia to Deploy Space Monitoring Stations in South Africa, Mexico and Chile,” *Space in Africa*, March 07, 2019, <https://africanews.space/russia-to-deploy-space-monitoring-stations-in-south-africa-mexico-and-chile/>.
- 47 “Russia halts dialogue with Chile on station for monitoring outer space,” TASS, February 01, 2021, <https://tass.com/science/1251509>.
- 48 Ibid.
- 49 Douglas Farah and Marianne Richardson, “Dangerous Alliances: Russia’s Strategic Inroads in Latin America,” Center for Strategic Research, December 21, 2022, <https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/inss/strategic-perspectives-41.pdf>.
- 50 U.S. Department of State, “U.S.-Chile Political-Military Dialogue,” September 26, 2023, <https://www.state.gov/u-s-chile-political-military-dialogue/>; U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Chile Joint Statement on High-Level Dialogue,” November 17, 2022, <https://www.state.gov/u-s-chile-joint-statement-on-high-level->



- dialogue/#:~:text=The%20United%20States%20and%20Chile,in%202023%20on%20energy%20cooperation.
- 51 U.S. Army, Eric R. Lucero, “Chilean visit to Fort Hood sets framework for intelligence sharing,” August 19, 2014, [https://www.army.mil/article/132069/chilean\\_visit\\_to\\_fort\\_hood\\_sets\\_framework\\_for\\_intelligence\\_sharing](https://www.army.mil/article/132069/chilean_visit_to_fort_hood_sets_framework_for_intelligence_sharing).
  - 52 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearing To Receive Testimony On The Posture of the United States Northern Command And United States Southern Command In Review Of The Defense Authorization Request For Fiscal Year 2024 And The Future Years Defense Program 118th Cong.*, 1st sess., 2023, <https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/download/transcript-3232023?download=1>.
  - 53 Nicolás García, “El Ejército de Chile y el Ejército de EEUU realizan el ejercicio de montaña Southern Vanguard 21,” September 02, 2021, <https://www.infodefensa.com/texto-diario/mostrar/3122277/ejercito-chile-ejercito-eeuu-realizan-ejercicio-montana-southern-vanguard-21>; U.S. Army Chief of Staff (@ArmyChiefStaff), “@10MTNDIV Soldiers conducted Exercise Southern Vanguard 21, in Portillo, #Chile, recently. It was a 2-week combined high altitude, cold weather training exercise between U.S. and Chilean forces to strengthen relationships and build interoperability.” X, September 07, 2021, 6:00am, <https://twitter.com/ArmyChiefStaff/status/1435181073386852357?lang=en>.
  - 54 Joshua Taeckens, “U.S., Chilean armies complete Southern Vanguard training exercise,” Joint Base San Antonio, September 02, 2021, <https://www.jbsa.mil/News/News/Article/2763581/us-chilean-armies-complete-southern-vanguard-training-exercise/>; Garcia, “El Ejército de Chile.”
  - 55 United States Southern Command, “U.S. Air Force gunship trains in Chile alongside Bullfighter, Chilean, US JTACs,” August 08, 2023, <https://www.southcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/Article/3489856/us-air-force-gunship-trains-in-chile-alongside-bullfighter-chilean-us-jtacs/>; N.W. Huertas, “Chilean and US Forces Carry out Combined Exercise Southern Star 2022, *Diálogo América*, October 11, 2022, <https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/chilean-and-us-forces-carry-out-combined-exercise-southern-star-2022/>.
  - 56 Saavedra, “US and Chile Strengthen Ties.”
  - 57 “U.S.-Chilean Defense Ministers sign agreement to expand cooperation,” Embassy of the United States in the Republic of Chile, October 12, 2016, <https://cl.usembassy.gov/u-s-chilean-defense-ministers-sign-agreement-expand-cooperation/>.
  - 58 Republic of Chile, Senate, “Impulsarán la cooperación técnico militar entre Chile y Rusia,” June 18, 2014, <https://www.senado.cl/sala-de-sesiones/impulsaran-la-cooperacion-tecnico-militar-entre-chile-y-rusia>.
  - 59 Ibid.
  - 60 Saavedra, “US and Chile Strengthen Ties.”
  - 61 The top countries that sell to Chile in terms of SIPRI’s Trend Indicator Values (TIV) are the U.S., UK, Germany, and Australia at \$296, \$259, \$242, and \$129 million dollars, respectively. These are measures of military capability transfers rather than the financial value of arms transfers.
  - 62 Chilean Army, “Ejército De Chile Explora.”
  - 63 Russian Aviation, “Russia offered Chile Yak-130.”
  - 64 Ibid.
  - 65 Ibid.
  - 66 “Where Russia Markets and Sells Advanced Conventional Weapons,” RAND, accessed October 14, 2023, <https://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/russian-arms-sales-and-sanctions-compliance/where-russia-markets-and-sells-military-equipment.html>.
  - 67 “Paraguay, Chile want to buy Russia’s Ansat multirole helicopters,” TASS, April 05, 2017, [https://tass.com/defense/939631?utm\\_source=google.com&utm\\_medium=organic&utm\\_campaign=google.com&utm\\_referrer=google.com](https://tass.com/defense/939631?utm_source=google.com&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=google.com&utm_referrer=google.com).
  - 68 “Russia Exports of arms and ammunition, parts and accessories to Chile,” Trading Economics,” accessed November 02, <https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/exports/chile/arms-ammunition-parts-accessories>.
  - 69 Ibid.
  - 70 Farah and Richardson, “Dangerous Alliances.”
  - 71 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Relations With Chile,” January 30, 2024, <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-chile/>.
  - 72 Harry McNeil, “Lockheed Martin secures \$177m contract to upgrade Chilean F-16 fighter jets,” Airforce Technology, November 01, 2023, <https://www.airforce-technology.com/news/lockheed-martin-secures-177m-contract-to-upgrade-chilean-f-16-fighter-jets/?cf-view>.
  - 73 Huseyin Erdogan, “Russia, Chile sign nuke cooperation deal,” Anadolu Agency, May 15, 2018, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/energy/nuclear/russia-chile-sign-nuke-cooperation-deal-/20050>.
  - 74 Ibid.
  - 75 Henry Sanderson and Nastassia Astrasheuskaya, “Russia’s Rosatom looks to buy 51% of giant Chilean lithium mine,” Financial Times, October 15, 2019, <https://www.ft.com/content/c9c91a68-ef55-11e9-bfa4-b25f11f42901>; “Wealth to sell controlling stake in Chile project to Uranium One,” Mining Journal, October 15, 2019, <https://www.mining-journal.com/energy-minerals-news/news/1373615/wealth-to-sell-controlling-stake-in-chile-project-to-uranium-one>.
  - 76 Polina Devitt and Dave Sherwood, “Russia’s Rosatom may buy controlling stake in Chile lithium project,” Reuters, October 15, 2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chile-lithium-russia/russias-rosatom-may-buy-controlling-stake-in-chile-lithium-project-idUSKBN1WU1MI>.
  - 77 Antonieta de la Fuente, “El ruso sueño de entrar al litio chileno,” *Diario Financiero*, March 05, 2022, <https://dfmas.df.cl/df-mas/glocal/el-sueno-ruso-de-entrar-al-litio-chileno>.

- 78 Ryan C. Berg and T. Andrew Sady-Kennedy, “South America’s Lithium Triangle: Opportunities for the Biden Administration,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 21, 2021, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/south-americas-lithium-triangle-opportunities-biden-administration>.
- 79 “Argentina, Chile suspended lithium supplies to Russia — official,” TASS, April 12, 2022, [https://tass.com/economy/1436649?utm\\_source=google.com&utm\\_medium=organic&utm\\_campaign=google.com&utm\\_referrer=google.com](https://tass.com/economy/1436649?utm_source=google.com&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=google.com&utm_referrer=google.com).
- 80 James Attwood, “Why Chile’s New Approach to Lithium Matters Globally,” *The Washington Post*, July 26, 2023, [https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/energy/2023/07/26/why-chile-s-new-approach-to-lithium-matters-globally/a6d7cde6-2bcf-11ee-a948-a5b8a9b62d84\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/energy/2023/07/26/why-chile-s-new-approach-to-lithium-matters-globally/a6d7cde6-2bcf-11ee-a948-a5b8a9b62d84_story.html).
- 81 Annabel Cossins-Smith, “Albemarle to expand Chile lithium mine by 2028,” *Mining Technology*, May 12, 2023, <https://www.mining-technology.com/news/albemarle-chile-lithium-expansion/>.
- 82 Attwood, “Why Chile’s New Approach.”
- 83 Christopher Stewart, “Chile Stands with Ukraine During EU-Latin American Summit,” *Kyiv Post*, July 19, 2023, <https://www.kyivpost.com/post/19613>.

---

## Authors

**a. Mr. Lucas Winter** is Senior Analyst, Middle East/North Africa, at the Foreign Military Studies Office. He has an M.A. in International Relations from Johns Hopkins SAIS and was an Arabic Language Flagship Fellow in Damascus, Syria in 2006-2007.

**b. Dr. Jason Warner** is a Senior Analyst for Africa and terrorism/transnational crime and Director of Research at the Foreign Military Studies Office. He is the author of two books, *The Islamic State in Africa* (Oxford University Press, 2021) and *African Foreign Policies in International Institutions* (Palgrave, 2017) as well as dozens of peer-reviewed articles and reports on African security and international affairs. He holds a Ph.D. from Harvard in African Studies.

**c. Mr. Keven Hernandez** is a Research Fellow at the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office. He holds an MA in Security Studies from Georgetown University. He also holds a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations from the University of California, San Diego. He has interned for the Organization of American States for the Department against Transnational Organized Crime and is a U.S. Army reservist. Fluent in Spanish, he is also learning Portuguese.

## The Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO)

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC G-2)  
Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027

[HTTPS://FMSO.TRADOC.ARMY.MIL](https://fmsotr.adoc.army.mil)

*The Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is part of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command G-2, whose mission is to understand, describe, assess and deliver the conditions of the operational environment. For over 30 years, FMSO has conducted open-source research on foreign perspectives of the operational environment, emphasizing those topics that are understudied or unconsidered. FMSO's products are integral to critical thinking in the Army's leadership, analytic communities, and military education, and wherever there is a professional interest in what "they think they think."*